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US defense strategy focuses on diplomacy with deterrence

By Djoomart Otorbaev | China Daily | Updated: 2026-02-09 08:04
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An American flag flies outside of the US Capitol dome in Washington, US, Jan 15, 2020. [Photo/Agencies]

The latest United States' National Defense Strategy, released after weeks of internal debate and delay, warrants close examination not only for its explicit statements but also for what it leaves out, softens, and rephrases. As a document published every four years, the NDS typically indicates Washington's key threats and priorities. This time, however, it inadvertently offers an insightful external evaluation of China's overall national power.

The strategy comes during a period of unprecedented growth in American defense expenditure. The 2026 military budget has reached a historic $901 billion, with US President Donald Trump publicly pledging to increase it to $1.5 trillion by 2027. Typically, such high levels of spending align with aggressive strategic stances.

However, this new document signifies a shift from earlier policies, especially those from 2018 and 2022, which primarily regarded China as the main and most significant threat to US security. The shift is subtle in language but profound in meaning.

The new NDS differs from previous versions by no longer positioning China as the main focus of the US defense strategy. Notably, Taiwan is entirely absent from the document, which is highly unusual for recent decades. This omission indicates that Washington has reevaluated the risks, costs and practicality of getting involved.

The strategy indicates that China, described as "the second most powerful country in the world after the US", should be deterred "through force, not confrontation". This wording is significant because it acknowledges China's strength but avoids the ideological tone of rivalry found in previous texts. Instead of confrontation, deterrence is emphasized; instead of escalation, stability is prioritized.

This development did not happen in isolation. According to American media reports, the launch of the NDS was postponed due to intense internal debate over how to represent China amid ongoing trade negotiations. The reality is clear: China's economic influence and systemic significance have become limits on US strategic rhetoric itself.

From a structural standpoint, this demonstrates China's achievement in developing a resilient, diversified and globally connected economy. China has transitioned from being just a manufacturing hub or export platform to becoming a key node in global supply chains, including sectors vital for advanced military capabilities. An example of this is the US defense sector's dependence on rare earth elements, where China holds a dominant role. Achieving strategic autonomy is challenging when reliance on external materials cannot be avoided.

The new strategy emphasizes this shift by characterizing Russia as a "persistent but manageable" threat and urging Europe to take primary responsibility for its security, including in Ukraine. It also openly acknowledges that Europe's share of global economic power is diminishing, necessitating the prioritization of US resources elsewhere.

However, "elsewhere" does not imply a more confrontational stance in the "Indo-Pacific". Instead, the focus is on defending the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere. This geographical shift marks a significant change in priorities. For the first time since the Cold War ended, the US has openly moved away from "grand strategies" and instead prioritized what it refers to as the "practical interests" of the American public.

From China's viewpoint, this shift reflects a strategic realism driven by evolving global circumstances, not US weakness in purely military terms. China's ascent has shifted the cost-benefit analysis of conflict, as economic interdependence, technological rivalry and China's large domestic market render zero-sum strategies less viable.

Importantly, the strategy does not characterize China's success as ideological or civilizational. It avoids moral binaries and implicitly accepts multipolarity. China is seen as a country to be managed rather than transformed or contained through systemic confrontation. This marks a notable shift from the previous US outlook.

The omission of Taiwan from the document should also be viewed within this framework. A strategic silence can sometimes carry as much significance as an explicit declaration. It indicates that Washington is becoming more conscious of the dangers associated with using the Taiwan question as a tool in larger rivalries. Currently, the emphasis on stability, predictability and economic continuity has become more prominent in US decision-making.

At a deeper level, the new NDS demonstrates China's sustained strategic focus. Over the years, China has prioritized economic growth, technological advancement, supply chain robustness, and global connectivity. These goals, sometimes overlooked or misread internationally, have now resulted in achievements that influence the strategic plans of other major powers.

The strategy emphasizes diplomacy with China alongside deterrence, emphasizing its importance. Engaging in diplomacy is vital when the other party holds leverage. It should not be seen as a concession but as a recognition of the actual situation.

In summary, the US NDS unintentionally validates China's overall national power. Without using celebratory language or direct recognition, it portrays a world where China is no longer a challenge to be overcome but a fundamental reality to be accepted.

For observers in China, the takeaway is not victory but confirmation. The reshaping of the global balance is driven by strategic patience, economic strength, and ongoing development. When even the world's most powerful military forces alter their language, priorities and ambitions, the importance of that transformation is hard to overlook.

The author is a former prime minister of the Kyrgyz Republic.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.

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