When President Xi Jinping launched the Global Development Initiative in 2021, the timing could not have been more appropriate. The world was emerging from the chaos of the COVID-19 pandemic, global development had stalled and faith in multilateral cooperation was waning. The GDI aimed to address global challenges, while accelerating the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

GDI reflects China's efforts to shape global development norms by focusing on eight priority areas: poverty reduction, food security, pandemic response and vaccines, financing for development, climate change and green development, industrialization, digital economy and digital-era connectivity. In doing so, the GDI complements China's Belt and Road Initiative by incorporating a more human-centered development narrative.

GDI works through capacity-building programs and small-scale pilot projects, focusing on partnerships with UN agencies. It also fosters development cooperation with fewer political conditions and places emphasis on digital, social and green development. Several GDI projects are bundled with BRI investments, particularly in the infrastructure and energy sectors.

For ASEAN, the GDI presents both an opportunity to diversify development partnerships and a platform for constructive competition among major powers. ASEAN is central to GDI due to its strategic location in global supply chains, its relative political stability within the Global South and the balance in its ties with China and the United States. For the region, the GDI is a policy option that can increase its bargaining power amid the intensifying geopolitical competition.

ASEAN countries engage with China's GDI because it gives them access to development finance as an alternative to Western-led institutions. It also opens the door to technology transfer, especially Chinese expertise in digital infrastructure and green technology.

Not surprisingly, several ASEAN countries have joined China's GDI, although the level and focus of participation vary based on national priorities and existing partnerships with China. For example, Laos benefits from GDI-aligned projects such as the China-Laos Railway, which enhances regional trade and tourism. For Vietnam, the key areas of engagement are renewable energy and agricultural technology, including digital farming and climate-resilient crop projects. However, Vietnam engages in projects that align with its foreign policy and Malaysia joins BRI and GDI projects that suit its domestic needs.

In the case of Thailand, the GDI emphasizes digital capacity building and institutional learning, which align with Thailand's transition toward a digital and innovation-driven economy. Rather than replacing the domestic digital investment, GDI complements Thailand's existing strategies by reducing the institutional and learning costs associated with digital transformation.

GDI-related cooperation could support Thailand's digital economy by facilitating knowledge exchange on digital government and public-sector digitalization, including the use of big data and AI in policy formulation. Furthermore, it supports human capital development through training programs for civil servants, local administrators, and technology professionals.

For example, Thailand's Ministry of Digital Economy and Society has signed agreements with its Chinese counterparts, including the National Development and Reform Commission, to promote joint efforts in AI and digital infrastructure cooperation. As part of this cooperation, the use of AI and smart solutions is being explored in both industry and public services to enhance efficiency and innovation. This partnership helps Thailand accelerate its digital transformation goals by providing Thai institutions and businesses exposure to advanced technologies and best practices.

This way Thailand can align the GDI with its own economic strategies. It can focus on smart and sustainable agriculture, digital government and public-sector AI, health care and aging society solutions, and community-level green transitions.

It is important to note that China's GDI can contribute to Thailand's development not through large-scale financial assistance, but through policy cooperation, capacity building and digital transformation support. For Thailand, GDI should not be viewed merely as foreign aid, but as a strategic and institutional tool to enhance its regional role. Thailand could also position itself as a regional hub for GDI training and policy dialogue. At the same time, Thailand should utilize GDI as a balancing instrument rather than a signal of political alignment. It must ensure local participation, transparency and genuine technology transfer.

Thailand should position itself as a strategic partner and an institutional hub rather than merely a development aid recipient under GDI. The GDI allows China to deepen its ties with Southeast Asia. The long-term success of the initiative will depend on how much it benefits all stakeholders.

The author is an associate professor in the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, Thailand.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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