UK is recalibrating its relations with China based on engagement as risk management

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Keir Starmer paid an official visit to China from Jan 28 to 31, the first visit to China by a UK prime minister since 2018. Accompanied by Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle and a delegation of senior business leaders, the visit underscored a shared emphasis on pragmatism in bilateral engagement.

For much of the post-Cold War era, Western Europe operated within a familiar strategic bargain: The United States’ hegemony supplied the overarching security architecture, set the political rhythm of the transatlantic system and — when crises arrived — offered a degree of economic and financial reassurance. Over time, this dependence evolved into what can be described as an asymmetric alignment strategy: remaining anchored to the US’ orbit, leaning on security promises and assuming that the same hegemonic system would ultimately buffer major economic stress.

This strategy, however, was often narrated in ways that diverged from its actual operation. Framed as principled autonomy or values-led positioning, it masked a continued structural dependence. As global conditions shifted, with rising costs of dominance, dispersed power, diversified supply chains and recurrent economic shocks, the gap between narrative and reality widened. The transatlantic assurance that Western Europe once took for granted has consequently lost much of its capacity to deliver prosperity, stability or influence.

Against this backdrop, the UK delegation’s visit to China carries significance beyond ceremony. Such an initiative does not automatically imply a reversal of alliances or a dismissal of concerns, but it does indicate a recalibration toward practical statecraft: dialogue as governance, engagement as risk management, and diplomacy as an instrument of national interest in a changing world.

The UK’s prospective recalibration toward engagement with China can be understood through three structural drivers.

First, the asymmetric alignment strategy is no longer sufficient as an economic answer. While the UK has aligned itself with the US at the strategic and security level, its economic structure remains overwhelmingly anchored in Europe. Even after Brexit, the European Union accounted for around 41 percent of UK exports and 51 percent of imports in 2024. By contrast, the US, despite being the UK’s single largest national trading partner, absorbed only around 16 percent of UK goods exports, with an even smaller share on the import side. This imbalance highlights a central contradiction of the UK’s post-Brexit posture: strategic reliance has shifted toward the US, but trade dependence has not followed. The UK’s fiscal watchdog has acknowledged that Brexit has reduced overall trade intensity by around 15 percent, a loss that closer security alignment with the US has not been able to offset.

Under these conditions, diversification is not symbolism — it is macro risk management. That is why “pragmatic” re-engagement with China sits alongside alliance commitments: with UK-China annual trade volume already exceeding $100 billion in recent years, China remains one of the few markets large enough to matter in macroeconomic terms. For the UK navigating post-Brexit constraints and energy volatility, diversification toward such scale is not a strategic pivot, but a necessary component of economic risk management.

Second, standards are no longer a technical afterthought; they increasingly define market access, interoperability and competitive advantage. As economic gravity shifts, the centers where such rules are negotiated and consolidated are also being reorganized. In this context, China is now a primary arena where rules are written, not merely a market where goods are sold. In the standards ecosystem that shapes green and digital technologies, China’s footprint has expanded sharply. By the end of 2022, it had submitted 1,337 proposals for the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission standards, placing it among the most active contributors. In telecoms and digital infrastructure, global technical rules continue to accumulate at a pace. In 2024 alone, the International Telecommunication Union issued 412 new ITU-T Recommendations, and the competitive advantage increasingly goes to those present when the specifications harden into global baselines. In practice, many of these standards are shaped not only in multilateral forums, but also in large-scale deployment markets where China is gradually playing a central role.

For the UK that sells high-value services and seeks leadership in finance, regulation, life sciences and clean-tech investment, engagement becomes a competitiveness issue. If the UK is absent from the rooms where interoperability, carbon accounting, data governance, electric vehicle and grid standards, and “green digital” frameworks are contested, it risks becoming a rule-taker — absorbing standards set elsewhere and discovering the costs only when market access tightens.

Third, influence requires presence rather than posture — because when engagement collapses, Europe’s capacity to shape outcomes tends to collapse with it. A practical illustration is the EU-China investment track: the EU’s Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was intended to lock in improved market access and rule clarity, but its political derailment left Europe with fewer institutional levers and less agenda-setting power over the very terms it sought to influence. The lesson for the UK is not “naive openness”; it is that structured dialogue is a form of power in an era defined by investment screening, technology governance, supply-chain redesign and climate coordination. Presence does not remove risk, but it increases the capacity to manage risk with predictability — and reduces the likelihood that others will write the rules first and present them to the UK later as faits accomplis.

If the UK’s bearings are indeed changing, credibility will depend on disciplined execution rather than symbolism. Five principles offer a practical framework for engagement without illusions.

First, engage without romanticism or demonization. Cooperation and competition will coexist. A mature approach accepts complexity, avoids emotional extremes, and builds stable channels for dialogue.

Second, define boundaries clearly and consistently. National security constraints — especially on sensitive technologies, critical data and dual-use sectors — must be predictable. Ambiguity generates mistrust and miscalculation; clarity reduces crisis risk.

Third, separate values from theater. Values and human dignity remain important elements of foreign policy. But moral performance cannot substitute for policy design. Effective diplomacy requires continuity, process and seriousness rather than headline-driven signaling.

Fourth, make reciprocity the central metric. Success cannot be measured by photo opportunities or the number of announcements. It must be assessed through reciprocity: market access, transparent rules, reliable dispute mechanisms and institutional confidence that can survive political cycles.

And last, coordinate internationally while maintaining independent judgment. Coordination with allies has value, but strategic dependence on external political moods reduces national flexibility. Independent judgment remains essential for long-term resilience.

The deeper story unfolding across Europe is not solely about China. It is about the recognition that the old asymmetric alignment strategy — built on US hegemony, security promises and expectations of economic cushioning — has reached its limits. That architecture may persist, but it will not deliver the same level of assurance Western Europe once assumed. In this sense, Europe’s challenge is to correct narrative misalignment by building a strategy that matches the world as it is.

The UK prime minister’s visit to China should be interpreted within this broader transition. It represents an adjustment from inherited comfort to practical governance — recognizing that stability now requires not only alliances, but also dialogue; not only principles, but also process; not only security, but also economic resilience.

If handled carefully, this moment will not be defined by surrender or defiance. It will be defined by statecraft: building durable channels, managing risk without isolation and navigating a changing world with strategic realism.

The author is a professor of innovation studies at Liaoning University.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.